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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship on racial discrimination has turned to the science of implicit
social cognition to explain how the human mind automatically manifests biases
against disfavored social groups.' Much of this discourse on implicit bias focuses
on the potential for massive, but hard to detect discrimination in the employment
context.2 Yet, other legal domains where implicit racial bias may lead to persistent
racial inequalities remain underexplored, most notably in criminal law.
Specifically, a crucial question still needs to be answered: do implicit biases affect
jury guilty/not guilty verdicts in racially biased ways?
Despite the broad incorporation of social science knowledge into legal
discourse, a critical chasm continues to deter legal scholarship from fully achieving
the social cognition-informed perspective it craves. Namely, legal scholarship on
implicit bias lacks law-focused science.3 Legal analysts have implicitly assumed
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See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1497-1539 (2005);
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995); Justin D.
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57
DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) [hereinafter Forgotten Racial Equality]; Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot:
Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155 (2005).
2 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination Law,
94 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (2006) [hereinafter The Structural Turn]; Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REv. 741 (2005); Krieger, supra note 1;
Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VIl, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The
Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REv. 913
(1999); Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 481 (2005).
There have been a few empirical studies of implicit bias in the legal setting. See infra
Section 1I-C for an overview of this empirical legal scholarship.
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that existing social cognition measures, many of which are carefully developed and
rigorously tested (but not developed with the law in mind), are the only options for
theory development in the legal context. These tests have been groundbreaking in
social psychological scholarship and their introduction into legal scholarship has
addressed the need for the law to possess an understanding of the human mind.
Yet, the still emerging legal model of the human mind has failed to develop new
empirical tests that measure how implicit cognitive processes function not just in
society in general, but specifically in legally relevant contexts such as jury
decision-making.
Here is one example: a frequently cited psychological measure of implicit bias,
the Implicit Association Test ("IAT"), examines people's implicit associations by
measuring response speed in a computerized test.4 In one of the most famous IATs,
study participants are asked to pair together words representing attitudes (Good
and Bad) and photos depicting target group members (Black and White) as fast as
they can.5 The results of these studies show that, when measuring response times
and error rates, the vast majority of people are faster to pair together Good with
White and Bad with Black. 6  These results are considered to be indicative of
implicit bias, and are eye-opening when considered in the legal context.7  Yet
might these studies do even more to examine implicit bias in the legal system? For
example, why should legal scholars be satisfied to rely on psychological research
relating to implicit racial attitudes of "good" and "bad," (and then engage in heated
debate about what it really means in the legal context8 ) when it is possible to
4 Researchers call this "response latency." See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
Measuring Individual Diferences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1467 (1998) [hereinafter Measuring Individual Differences];
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 123 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 2001).
s See Banaji, supra note 4, at 123, 136; Greenwald et al., supra note 4, at 1465; Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv 1195, 1198-
99 (2009) [hereinafter Trial Judges].
6 See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY RES. & PRAC. 101, 105-06 (2002).
7 See Kang, supra note 1, at 1493 (calling implicit social cognition findings "stunning").
Although legal debates involving the IAT have mostly focused on attitude IATs, these
debates are both broad in scope and sophisticated, and focus on everything from the meaning of
reaction times (and the particular methods of scoring those reaction times) to issues of predictive
validity (the issue of whether the IAT predicts anything meaningful). See Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 477 (2007)
[hereinafter "Science" and Antidiscrimination Law]; Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal
Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087
(2008); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 737 (2009) [hereinafter Facts Do Matter]; Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock,
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIo ST. L.J. 1023, 1028, 1032-33 (2006)
[hereinafter Perils ofMindreading] (arguing that some legal scholars tend to propose legal solutions
to the IAT without investigating alternative causes for the IAT's results).
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specifically test implicit associations of well known legally meaningful constructs,
such as "guilty" and "not guilty?"9
To address the lack of legally-focused empirical studies exploring implicit
bias, we developed a new IAT: the Black/White, Guilty/Not Guilty IAT
("Guilty/Not Guilty IAT"). We designed this IAT to examine whether people hold
implicit associations between African Americanso and criminal guilt, a finding
that would call into question criminal law's presumption of innocence and evoke
larger questions of racial justice. Although the debate over racial disparities in the
criminal justice system has been raging for decades," scholars have rarely adapted
social cognition methodology to examine specifically the role of race in criminal
law decision-making.12 We therefore created and developed the Guilty/Not Guilty
IAT, and predicted that people implicitly associate Black and Guilty compared to
White and Guilty. Because it is important not just to test implicit associations
9 Like the debates on the Good-Bad attitude IAT, scholars should critique all law-focused
social science.
10 Because the IAT measures implicit associations related to photos of Black males, we
cannot always know specifically that IAT results are due to stereotypes of African Americans rather
than stereotypes of other Black males. However, social cognition researchers consistently find that
using photos of Black males triggers stereotypes of African American males. See, e.g., B. Keith
Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role ofAutomatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving
a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181, 187 (2001) (finding that showing participants
Black faces for 200 milliseconds acted to trigger racial stereotypes associated with African
Americans). To confirm that we were testing stereotypes of African American men, in our empirical
study we specifically referred to the target group as "African American."
" For more on racial disparities in the criminal justice system, see, for example, RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., & Austin Sarat eds., 2006); Scott Phillips,
Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 Hous. L. REv. 807, 811-12 (2008).
12 There are a few studies where scholars have employed social cognition methodologies in
the legal setting. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1, at 354; Rachlinski et al.,
Trial Judges, supra note 5; Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-
Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge
Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007). For a discussion of some of these studies, see infra
notes 42-55 and accompanying text. Interestingly, outside of the context of race, quite a few legal
scholars have relied on social cognition research and cognitive psychology more broadly. One such
area is in developing models of jury decision-making. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOzo L. REv. 519
(1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Dan Simon, A Third View
of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004).
Another widely researched area that usually does not consider race, but frequently incorporates
empirical social cognition work, is behavioral law and economics. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
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themselves, but to investigate whether they predict meaningful behaviors, 3 we
also tested whether responses on the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT predict the way mock
jurors evaluate ambiguous trial evidence. The results of our study confirmed our
hypotheses: study participants held strong associations between Black and Guilty,
relative to White and Guilty, and these implicit associations predicted the way
mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence. Furthermore, we compared our
measure to a frequently administered IAT that tests positive and negative attitudes
towards race, the Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT, and found that the Guilty/Not Guilty
IAT and the Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT functioned differently, a result that
demonstrates the uniqueness of the Guilty/Not Guilty measure.
This Article introduces the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT, details the empirical study
we conducted, and argues for the need to increase collaborations to employ social
cognition methods to test legal hypotheses. Section II presents an overview of IAT
research in the legal context, and notes the limited number of empirical studies that
have been employed. Section III sets the stage for our empirical study, first by
reviewing the science behind the IAT, and second, by contextualizing the meaning
of the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT within the doctrine of the presumption of innocence.
Section IV details the empirical study we conducted. The study tested implicit
associations within an important legal domain and examined whether these implicit
associations matter in legal decision-making. Results of the study showed that
participants held implicit associations between Black and Guilty compared to
White and Guilty, and that these implicit associations predicted mock-juror
evaluations of ambiguous evidence. Section V briefly discusses the implications
of the study, and calls for increased empirical collaborations. Section VI
concludes.
II. IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST
Legal scholarship on implicit bias has emerged rapidly since 2005.14 By
engaging in a science-based dialogue and by endeavoring to understand the
13 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009)
(showing that the IAT predicts behaviors in many circumstances); Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges,
supra note 5. See also Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: Reassessing the
Predictive Validity of the IAT, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 567 (2009) (disputing the results of prior
articles claiming that the race IAT predicts behaviors); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Weak
Criticisms and Selective Evidence: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009), 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 583 (2009)
(responding to Blanton et al.'s critique); Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Strong Rebuttal for
Weak Criticisms: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009), 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 590 (2009) (criticizing
Blanton et al.'s critique of their prior data); Hart Blanton et al., Transparency Should Trump Trust:
Rejoinder to McConnell and Leibold (2009) and Ziegert and Hanges (2009), 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
598 (2009) (maintaining their skepticism about whether the IAT reliably predicts discriminatory
behavior).
14 Work on what many legal scholars have called "unconscious bias" was introduced
conceptually in the 1980s by Charles Lawrence as part of an exploration of anti-discrimination law.
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complexities of the human mind, this scholarship has opened up new ways of
understanding societal inequality. This section sets the stage for our empirical
study of implicit racial bias by examining one of the most compelling measures of
implicit bias, the IAT.15 The section first explains the IAT itself. It then reviews
legal scholarship that specifically discusses the IAT. Finally, it considers the few
instances of legal scholarship employing empirical methods to run the IAT in legal
context.
A. The Science of the IAT
The IAT measures implicit cognitions in a simple and compelling way. It
asks participants to categorize information as quickly as possible, and then
calculates a participant's reaction time (in milliseconds) and accuracy in
completing the categorization task.16  The wisdom behind the IAT holds that
statistically significant speed and accuracy-based differences in a person's ability
to categorize different types of information reflect something meaningful in that
person's automatic cognitive processes.
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 331-36 (1987). See also Krieger, supra note 1 (introducing social
cognition research on unconscious bias to the employment discrimination context). More
contemporary work has evolved rapidly since Jerry Kang's 2005 examination of implicit social
cognition in the context of Federal Communications Commission policy. See Kang, supra note 1.
See also Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 599 (2009)
[hereinafter The Complicitous Mind]; Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1; Page, supra
note 1. A few law-based publications pre-2005 do mention the IAT, but the intense theoretical
debates over the IAT heated up with Kang's article. For articles considering the IAT prior to 2005,
see, for example, Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1241, 1250 (2002); Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Escaping the Circle by
Confronting Classroom Stereotyping: A Step toward Equality in the Daily Educational Experience of
Children of Color, 11 ASIAN L.J. 216, 228 n.65 (2004); Lateef Mtima, The Road to the Bench: Not
Even Good (subliminal) Intentions, 8 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 135, 156 (2001); Pollard, supra
note 2, at 918, 918 n.18; Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Association Test": A Measure of
Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 413-15 (2003);
Michael S. Shin, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in
Medical Care, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 2047, 2066 (2002).
1 Because other scholarship has thoroughly reviewed much of the broader work on
unconscious and implicit bias, we focus only on scholarship related to the IAT. For reviews, see
Kang, supra note 1; Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1; Justin D. Levinson &
Danielle Young, Diferent Shades of Bias: Skin tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of
Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REv. 307 (2010) [hereinafter Diferent Shades ofBias].
16 As psychologists Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald summarize, "[w]hen highly
associated targets and attributes share the same response key, participants tend to classify them
quickly and easily, whereas when weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response
key, participants tend to classify them more slowly and with greater difficulty." Nilanjana Dasgupta
& Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic
Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
800, 803 (2001).
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The following is a detailed description of the way the IAT is typically
conducted: Study participants, working on computers, press two pre-designated
keyboard keys as quickly as possible after seeing certain words or images on the
computer monitors. The words and images that participants see are grouped into
meaningful categories. These categories require participants to "pair an attitude
object (for example, Black or White . . . ) with either an evaluative dimension (for
example, good or bad) or an attribute dimension (for example, home or career,
science or arts) . ... Participants complete multiple trials of the pairing tasks,
such that researchers can measure how participants perform in matching each of
the concepts with each other. For example, in one trial of the most well known
IATs, participants pair the concepts Good-White together by pressing a designated
response key and the concepts Bad-Black together with a different response key.
After completion of the trial, participants then pair the opposite concepts with each
other, here Good-Black and Bad-White.' 8 The computer software that gathers the
data9 measures the number of milliseconds it takes for participants to respond to
each task. Scientists can then analyze (by comparing reaction times and error rates
using a statistic called "D-prime" 20) whether participants hold implicit associations
between the attitude object and dimension tested. Results of IATs conducted on
race consistently show that "white Americans express a strong 'white preference'
on the IAT."21
As a measure, the IAT is quite flexible. Researchers have created dozens of
different kinds of IATs. Some examples include: Gender-Science IAT, Gay-
Straight IAT, Obama-McCain IAT, and the Fat-Thin IAT, among many others.22
The Gender-Science IAT, for example, requires participants to group together
Male and Female photos with Science and Liberal Arts words. It is worth noting
the flexibility of the IAT to test either evaluative dimension words (such as
grouping Male-Female with Good-Bad), or attribute dimension words (such as
grouping Male-Female with Career-Family). The IAT we created, the Guilty/Not
Guilty IAT, requires participants to group together photos of White and Black
faces (attitude-object photos) and Guilty and Not Guilty words (attribute
17 Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1, at 355 (citing Banaji, supra note 4 at
117, 123).
18 Because participants may naturally be quicker at responding with one of their hands,
participants complete these tasks twice, once for each response key, to eliminate differences based on
hand preference. The order of the IAT tasks is also usually randomized to reduce order effects.
19 In our empirical study, we used the software Inquisit, produced by Millisecond Software.
20 See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I
An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 197, 201 (2003) [hereinafter
Improved Scoring Algorithm].
21 Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges, supra note 5, at 1199. See also Levinson, The Complicitous
Mind, supra note 14, at 612 (citing Brian Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit
Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. 36 (2008)).
22 See Project Implicit Website, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited October 30,
2010).
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dimension words). As we will discuss, our empirical study of the IAT tested both
the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT and the Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT,23 an evaluative
dimension IAT similar to the Good-Bad IAT.
B. The IAT as a Symbol ofImplicit Racial Bias
Legal commentators have often recognized that racial discrimination in
America has evolved from intentional and overt to unintentional and covert.24
Reflecting the change in the way racial bias is practiced and propagated, legal
scholarship considering implicit bias has most frequently focused on the ways in
which these covert biases manifest in society, such as in hiring and promotion
decisions.25 'In addition to explaining how the IAT and other social cognition
measures reveal implicit bias in society, this scholarship considers the ways in
which the law might react to the changing nature of discrimination.26 In this
subsection, we present a brief review of this legal scholarship. This summary
underscores the critical importance of seeking to understand implicit bias in the
law and highlights the need for projects that investigate the IAT in legally relevant
settings.
Several scholars have relied on the IAT in proposing ways that implicit bias is
relevant in the legal setting. In a fascinating project that introduced many legal
scholars to the IAT, Jerry Kang relied on the IAT and other social cognition
studies to argue that a Federal Communications Commission policy favoring local
news may actually serve to propagate implicit bias in society.27 Kang conducted a
detailed review of a variety of compelling social cognition projects, called the
results of IATs and other studies "stunning," and urged that researchers pursue a
broad research agenda in investigating implicit bias.28
Since Kang's 2005 project, scholars have considered other ways that the IAT
and other measures might reflect inequality in society or the legal system. For
23 See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).
24 See Krieger, supra note 1. See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Trapped in the Feedback Loop:
A Response to Professor Days, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1007, 1009 (2005) ("[T]here is an emerging
consensus that implicit or unconscious bias is becoming a more significant contributor to continuing
workplace inequalities."); Emily M.S. Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 905, 909 (2006);
McGinley, supra note 2, at 418 (noting that "the nature of discrimination has changed").
25 Levinson & Young, Diferent Shades ofBias, supra note 15, at 312-15.
26 For various perspectives on how the law might react to the changing nature of
discrimination, see Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 2; Blasi, supra note 14, at 1246-54;
Krieger, supra note 1; Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006); Pollard,
supra note 2; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459, 522-67 (2001).
27 Kang, supra note 1.
28 Kang, supra note 1, at 1493, 1536-38.
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example, in separate projects, Justin Levinson and Antony Page relied on the IAT
and other social cognition studies in examining legal decision-making. Levinson
critiqued the ways people misremember information, and argued that judges and
29jurors may misremember case facts in racially biased ways. Page argued that
attorneys might unintentionally rely on implicit biases when using peremptory
challenges.o
Several scholars have even engaged in interdisciplinary collaborations to
increase the scientific sophistication of their analysis and to bolster their claims.
Linda Krieger, who famously introduced pre-IAT social cognition research to
employment discrimination scholars in the mid 1990s,31 teamed up with social
psychologist Susan Fiske and IAT co-creator Anthony Greenwald in separate
projects that further evaluated implicit social cognition in the law.32 3uilding on
claims made by Krieger before IAT research became mainstream, Krieger and
Fiske argued that employment discrimination law must change to account for the
changing nature of discrimination. Greenwald and Krieger explained the IAT in
great detail, and presented evidence that the IAT serves as a meaningful predictor
of behavior.34 Focusing on the changing nature of the debate over affirmative
action, Kang collaborated with another IAT co-creator, Mazharin Banaji. 3
Proposing a new model of affirmative action called "fair measures," Kang and
Banaji relied on the IAT and other social cognition research to argue that implicit
biases reflect continuing societal inequality that must be remedied.36
All of the studies discussed represent just some of a rapidly growing field;
more and more researchers claim that the IAT is a valid indicator that implicit
racial bias is present in society and the legal system. Yet the progress in
29 Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1.
30 Page, supra note 1, at 160.
31 See Krieger, supra note 1.
32 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 945 (2006); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 26.
3 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 26, at 1027-61. Krieger and Fiske suggested that the law
"extract from normative legal reasoning the intuitive social science already there and to subject it to
empirical scrutiny." Id. at 1061.
34 ' Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 32, at 952-55.
3s See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action, " 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1063 (2006).
36 See id. at 1090-1110.
37 Debra Lyn Bassett, The Rural Venue, 57 ALA. L. REv. 941, 944-45 (2006) (discussing the
rural venue and stereotypes); Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1119, 1137 (2006)
(considering the IAT and implicit biases in the context of system justification theory); Ivan E.
Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination
and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. REv. 83 (2008) (considering
standards of proof in light of social cognition work); Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, and Race
Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1035-1037, 1041 (2006) (suggesting that former
United States Chief Justice William Rehnquist may have harbored implicit racial biases, and further
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incorporating the IAT into legal scholarship has not been limitless. Scholars have
still yet to connect specifically the IAT measure with legal claims and have
generally been satisfied to stick to fairly broad statements regarding how implicit
bias manifests in the legal setting. Commentators have thus left open the question
of whether the IAT itself can demonstrate anything compelling enough to
legitimize legal changes. Most have argued that the compelling evidence of
hundreds of rigorously tested implicit social cognition studies, including but not
limited to the IAT, legitimizes some forms of legal or social change.38 Yet others
have been hesitant to accept the idea that legal change should be predicated on a
measure of something that is largely outside of a person's conscious control.39
And the debate seems to be heating up still.4 0 Notwithstanding this debate, a large
number of projects discussing the LAT and implicit bias continue to emerge in
legal scholarship.4 1
suggesting that the IAT could serve as a meaningful test in evaluating judicial nominees); David L.
Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2008) (focusing on the role of implicit bias in the workplace, especially as it is
related to expert testimony on implicit bias); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law ofImplicit
Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 969 (2006); Levinson, The Complicitous Mind, supra note 14; Justin D.
Levinson, Culture, Cognitions, and Legal Decision-Making, in HANDBOOK OF. MOTIVATION AND
COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES 423-39 (Richard M. Sorrentino & Susumu Yamaguchi eds., 2008);
Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (2008) (proposing a theory
of perceptual segregation). See also Dale Larson, Comment, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled:
Implicit Bias and the Regarded-As Prong of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 56 UCLA L. REv.
451 (2008).
3 See, e.g., Kang, supra note 1; Kang & Banaji, supra note 35; Krieger & Fiske, supra note
26; Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1; Page, supra note 1.
39 Mitchell & Tetlock, Perils ofMindreading, supra note 8; Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating
Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REv. 979 (2008).
40 See, e.g., Bagenstos, "Science" and Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 8; Adam
Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist
Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1135-43 (2008); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and
Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 427 (2007); Mitchell & Tetlock, Facts Do Matter, supra note 8.
41 See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Four Observations About Hate Speech, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 365-66 (2009) (suggesting that hate speech may lead to implicit bias);
Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Profiling: A Cognitive Model ofBias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR.
L. REv. 657, 658 (2007) (claiming that racial profiling relies on cognitive processes that harbor
implicit biases); Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the
Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (2008) (considering the relational aspects of implicit bias in
the workplace); Jonathan Kahn, Race, Genes, and Justice: A Call to Reform the Presentation of
Forensic DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 325, 373 (2008) (discussing the
results of IATs and stating, "To the extent that such implicit race bias might already be present
among average jurors, injecting race into the presentation of forensic DNA evidence presents a
significant danger of tainting the proceedings with unfair prejudice."); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic
Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 471, 479 (2008) (discussing implicit bias in the context of sexual
orientation bias); Avital Mentovich & John T. Jost, The Ideological "Id"? System Justification and
the Unconscious Perpetuation oflnequality, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1095 (2008) (considering Lawrence's
1987 article, supra note 14, in an updated scientific perspective); Michael B. Mushlin & Naomi
Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 42-46 (2009)
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The reliance on implicit social cognition research, and the IAT in particular,
not only underscores major progress in legal scholarship, but also highlights a gap
between implicit social cognition research and legal scholarship. Legal researchers
often rely on the IAT for the proposition that people are implicitly biased, and tend
to link it to a variety of legal claims. Yet few scholars have examined how the IAT
may be used as a measure to test something specific in the legal setting. The next
subsection reviews the small number of projects that have empirically examined
the TAT in the legal context. These empirical studies highlight the potential of
implementing tests such as the IAT in legally relevant contexts.
C. Law-Based Empirical Study of the IAT
Despite the growing familiarity with the TAT in legal scholarship, few
research teams have empirically tested the IAT in a legal setting.42 In an early
empirical study, Theodore Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson employed the IAT in
a legal setting by testing whether capital defense attorneys displayed implicit racial
bias.43 Using a paper and pencil version of the Good/Bad Black/White IAT, the
researchers found that the defense attorney participants, whom they expected to
resist bias if at all possible, harbored strong implicit bias against African
Americans.44 Like other early tests of the TAT, however, the researchers did not
test whether these implicit biases predicted the attorneys' decision-making.
Nonetheless, their work demonstrated compelling results among a particularly
noteworthy participant population.
In one of the only other law-focused empirical studies employing the IAT,
Jeffrey Rachlinski collaborated with Johnson and others to test the ability of the
(discussing implicit bias in the context of prisoners' rights); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a
Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62
VAND. L. REv. 55, 74-77 (2009) (predicting that implicit bias leads to housing discrimination against
illegal immigrants); Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, Michelle Obama: A Contemporary
Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination through the Lens of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 3 (2009) (considering race- and gender-based implicit bias in politics and in the workplace);
Gregory S. Parks & Shayne E. Jones, "Nigger": A Critical Race Realist Analysis of the N-Word
Within Hate Crimes Law, 98 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1305 (2008); Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do
Landlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 507
(2007) (noting that implicit bias may affect housing rentals more than employment decisions).
42 Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges, supra note 5, at 1204. Rachlinski and his colleagues
reported two studies in which researchers tested the predictive validity of the IAT in the legal setting.
Id. (citing Robert W. Livingston, When Motivation Isn't Enough: Evidence of Unintentional
Deliberative Discrimination Under Conditions of Response Ambiguity 9-10 (2002) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review); Arnd Florack et al., Der Einfluss
Wahrgenommener Bedrohung auf die Nutzung Automatischer Assoziationen bei der
Personenbeurteilung [The Impact of Perceived Threat on the Use of Automatic Associations in
Person Judgments], 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 249 (2001)).
43 See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1539, 1542 (2004).
4 Id. at 1545-48.
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Good/Bad IAT to predict judicial decision-making. 45 Rachlinski and his
colleagues recruited participants at judicial conferences, thus securing the unique
opportunity to test a participant pool of willing judges.46 The judge participants
took a Good/Bad Black/White IAT, and then completed a task that asked them to
make decisions in three hypothetical court scenarios.4 7 In two of these scenarios,
the race of the legal actor was ambiguous and was primed through a subliminal
procedure.48 In the third description, the race of the legal actor, White or Black,
was varied.4 9 The results of the study showed that, as in studies of the TAT in other
populations, the judge participants displayed an implicit preference for White over
Black.50 That is, participants were faster to group together photos of White faces
with Good words compared to Black faces with Good words. Next, the
researchers found that the TAT results predicted responses in some, but not all of
the judgment tasks." Specifically, they found that TAT results predicted racial bias
45 See Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges, supra note 5. It is important to note the specific IAT
that they employed, as different IATs may have different predictive abilities in various settings. For
example, Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore tested whether the Good/Bad IAT and Stereotype
IAT predicted participants' economic decisions. See Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore,
Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359
(2007). They found that the stereotype IAT, but not the Good/Bad IAT, predicted biases in economic
decision-making. Id. at 368.
46 The same researchers had previously used this technique to run empirical studies on judges.
See Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges, supra note 5, at 1205 (citing Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 13 (2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 814-15 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the
Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1256-59 (2006); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty ofDeliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1251, 1323-24 (2005)).
47 Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges, supra note 5, at 1207-08.
48 Id at 1212. Rachlinski and his colleagues used a procedure similar to one conducted by
Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery. Id. (citing Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming
Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 487-88
(2004)). Graham and Lowery's methodology was adapted from prior research conducted by Patricia
Devine (Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components,
56 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 7, 9, 13 (1989)), as well as John Bargh and Paula
Pietromonaco (John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information Processing and Social
Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness on
Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 437, 439,445 (1982)). The priming task
used by Rachlinski and his colleagues did not specifically prime Black for one group and White for
another, but Black for one group and ambiguous for the other. Rachlinski et. al., Trial Judges, supra
note 5, at 1213. It is also worth noting that the prime did not refer specifically to anything about the
legal stories they used, and was designed more generally to prime all related knowledge structures
and stereotypes of African Americans. Thus, it is unclear whether the results should be treated
similarly to a situation where the race of the legal actors had been primed.
49 Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges, supra note 5, at 1208.
5o Id. at 1209-11.
st Id. at 1211-19.
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in some cases where the defendant's race had been subliminally primed, but not in
cases where the race of the defendant was explicitly identified.52
Rachlinski and his colleagues summarized their results as indicating that
"judges, like the rest of us, possess implicit biases[,]"53 but noted that "the judges
managed, for the most part, to avoid the influence of unconscious biases when they
were told of the defendant's race."54 They concluded, that among other things,
"[t]he presence of implicit racial bias among judges-even if its impact on actual
cases is uncertain-should sound a cautionary note for those involved in the
criminal justice system."55
As the reviewed research demonstrates, when examining both non-empirical
and empirical applications of the IAT in the legal setting, two themes emerge: first,
legal scholars have mostly confined themselves to discussing how existing IATs
may or may not affect societal and legal decision-making; and second, the IAT has
rarely been evaluated to see if it predicts legal decision-making. We addressed
these themes in our empirical study, which tested a new IAT directly within the
legal setting and examined whether the IAT results predicted decision-making.
The next section explains why we created the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT and considers
its importance in light of legal doctrine on the presumption of innocence.
III. DEVELOPING AN IAT FOR THE LEGAL SETTING
Although empirical research on implicit bias has been prominent in legal
scholarship, there are significant opportunities to empirically investigate implicit
bias directly within meaningful legal domains. Some fundamental legal principles,
such as the presumption of innocence in criminal law, are particularly ripe for
empirical testing, first, because they harbor deep legal meaning, and second,
because they are formulated in a way that makes them testable.
A. A Law-Specific Measure of Bias
Scholars should strive to develop empirical measures that test legal concepts
as directly as possible. If one wants to test whether people hold implicit
associations between race and criminal guilt, one need not speculate: it is entirely
possible to examine just that. This is particularly the case when legal concepts
(such as Guilty/Not Guilty) hold deep societal meanings, both implicit and explicit,
that are different than the psychological concepts that are regularly tested. Phrased
another way, existing psychological measures may not measure the concepts the
law cares about most. Although the examination of non-legal concepts (such as
52 Id. at 1219.
s Id. at 1232.
54Id.
55Id.
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implicit attitudes of good-bad)5 6 can reveal deep societal inequalities and raise
questions of racial justice in the law (as scholars have consistently recognized 5 ), it
may not always be optimal to generalize social science results to the legal setting
when one can test legal concepts themselves.
Before designing a study, one should critically examine what that study might
demonstrate in light of existing scholarship. When considering whether to develop
an IAT to test whether people hold implicit associations between Black and Guilty,
one should first ask whether existing IATs might already answer this question. At
first glance, IATs testing implicit attitudes about race, such as good and bad,
pleasant and unpleasant, do not reveal jurors' or mock jurors' implicit associations
relating to a defendant's criminal guilt. Yet studies of predictive validity might
offer some value here. It is possible to examine whether implicit associations of
good and bad, for example, might predict Guilty and Not Guilty decisions. This
type of predictive validity study is desirable in that it relies on already validated
and widely available IATs to assess predictive validity.59 Such a study, including
the one conducted by Rachlinski and his colleagues, involves evaluating whether
there is a predictive relationship between implicit (good-bad) attitudes about race
and jury decision-making.6o If such a study convincingly demonstrated a link
between implicit attitudes (Black-bad) and jury decision (Guilty), then one might
conclude that implicit attitudes predict jury decisions in racially biased ways.
Because of this benefit, in addition to creating and testing the Guilty/Not Guilty
IAT, we also tested whether the Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT predicted mock juror
evaluations of evidence.
Despite the benefits of predictive validity research, from a legal perspective
there is a difference between testing predictive validity of implicit attitudes and
testing implicit associations regarding specific legal assumptions such as the
presumption of innocence. Although testing predictive validity can be eye-
opening, a predictive validity study of an attitude-based IAT could not fully
examine whether people hold implicit associations between Black and Guilty
56 Attitude targets, such as "good" and "bad", may reflect important societal principles, but
attitudes alone rarely have relevance in the legal system. Thus, to the extent that law holds
dichotomous constructs with independent meaning, such as Guilty/Not Guilty, the IAT is one proper
measure that can be used. Other similar measures include the Go/No-Go Association Task. See
Brian A. Nosek & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Go/No-Go Association Task, 19 Soc. COGNITION 625
(2001). This task, conceptually similar to the [AT, allows for researchers to test individual target
groups with dichotomous pairs. Id. at 627.
s7 See supra Section II.B and accompanying text.
58 It is not always easy to directly test legal concepts using the IAT. Because the IAT was
specifically designed to test dichotomous principles, the legal concept of Guilty/Not Guilty fits
particularly well into the structure of the test. Other dichotomous legal concepts could similarly be
tested using IAT.
5 See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., Trial Judges, supra note 5; Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 45.
6 Rachlinski and colleagues have published the only study doing this. See Rachlinski et al.,
Trial Judges, supra note 5. Rachlinski and colleagues cite an unpublished study by Livingston, supra
note 42, that they describe as linking the IAT to mock jury decisions. Id. at 1204.
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compared to White and Guilty. Examining these specific implicit associations is
particularly compelling in light of the presumption of innocence.
B. The (Implicit) Presumption of Guilt
The most compelling reason for testing implicit associations of guilt is that
the law espouses a presumption of innocence, a presumption that may be
contradicted by racial cues and the realities of the human mind. The presumption
of innocence is a fundamental principle of criminal law.6 1 According to the United
States Supreme Court in Coffin v. United States, "[t]he principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law."62
In light of the vast importance of the presumption of innocence, partially
underscored by the widespread public understanding that a defendant is "innocent
until proven guilty," it is not surprising that scholars have long questioned whether
there is a relationship between racial inequality and the presumption of innocence.
In 1883, Frederick Douglas surmised, "The reasonable doubt which is usually
interposed to save the life and liberty of a white man charged with crime, seldom
,, 63has any force or effect when a colored man is accused of crime. More
contemporary discussions of racial bias in criminal law underscore the potentially
deep connections between racial bias and the presumption of innocence. 64
Although none of these projects have empirically tested implicit associations of
race and criminal guilt, some scholars have considered that racial disparities in
conviction and sentencing may be driven by racial bias.65 Robert Entman and
61 Scholars have traced the presumption of innocence back to ancient Hebrew law, Roman
law, and medieval twelfth-century Italian law. See Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OILA. L.
REv. 257, 260-62 (2002). See also Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins
of a Legal Maxim, 63 JURIST 106 (2003) (providing a detailed account of the origins of the
presumption of innocence).
62 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence ... is a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice."). According to Scott Sundby, "the presumption of innocence is given
vitality primarily through the requirement that the government prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989).
63 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1611, 1612-13
(1985) (quoting Frederick Douglass as quoted in Symposium on The Black Lawyer in America Today,
HARv. L. SCH. BULL., Feb. 1971, at 6, 57).
6 See id.; KENNEDY, supra note 11. See also Montr6 D. Carodine, "The Mis-
Characterization of the Negro ": A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND.
L.J. 521, 527 (2009) ("When Blacks are unfairly 'taxed' in the criminal system with perceived
criminality, Whites receive an undeserved 'credit' with a perceived innocence or worthiness of
redemption.").
65 See Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution
and Wrongful Conviction in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REv. 403, 408 (1994) ("It is misguided to believe
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Kimberly Gross, for example, posited that "black defendants in criminal cases are
especially likely to be presumed guilty because they are subject to the stereotypes
or heuristics that most whites apply to the category 'black person.'" 66  These
scholars all maintain a shared perspective underlying our hypothesis: In a criminal
justice system that reveals continuing massive racial disparities, 67 it is quite
possible that African American defendants may be afforded a weaker presumption
of innocence than White defendants. Driven by this research question, we set out
to test it empirically.
IV. THE GUILTY/NOT GUILTY IAT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
This section details the empirical study we conducted. It first explains the
study we designed and then presents the results of the study.
A. Methods and Materials
Participants in the empirical study were sixty-seven jury eligible
undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Hawaii who participated
in the study for extra course credit.68 After giving informed consent, participants
that White folks can discard strongly held negative attitudes about Blacks when Whites act as police,
jurors, lawyers, or judges in criminal cases with a Black criminal defendant.. . . Once we admit racial
animus into the courtroom, we abandon the presumption of innocence standard that is supposedly
central to our jurisprudential traditions."). Within interdisciplinary scholarship, several projects have
investigated whether jurors hold racial biases using mock jury studies. Some scholars have
aggregated these studies in order to conduct large scale quantitative or qualitative reviews. See
Johnson, supra note 63; Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring
the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993); Tara L. Mitchell et al.,
Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 621 (2005); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We
Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 997 (2003).
66 Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and
Criminal Defendants, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 97 (2008). Several other articles at least
reference the idea that the presumption of innocence may be racially biased. See, e.g., Carodine,
supra note 64; Fair, supra note 65; Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy
of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt,
23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 153-55 (1994).
67 The U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that more than 6 in 10
inmates in local jails are minorities, including 41% "black." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES 1996 1, 3 (1998), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji96.pdf. In addition, the Bureau reports that the lifetime
likelihood of going to state or federal prison is 18.6% for "blacks" compared to 10% for Hispanics
and just 3.4% for "whites." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF
IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1971-2001 1, 8 (2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pius0l.pdf.
68 Data from one participant was excluded because it was incomplete. All but seven of the
participants, who were residents of other states, were jury eligible in Hawai'i. All participants were
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began the all-computerized task in a laboratory with two separate cubicles, each
containing a Dell desktop computer. Participants completed several measures,
including: a (Black/White) Guilty/Not Guilty IAT that we developed, a
(Black/White) Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT, 69 the Modem Racism Scale, feeling
thermometers, and a robbery evidence evaluation task.o Participants completed
the robbery evidence evaluation task first, and then completed the remaining tasks,
including the IATs, in randomized order. Participants provided demographic
information at the end of the study.
Participants completed the two IATs in counterbalanced order.7 ' One IAT
was the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT measure we developed: a race IAT with the
attribute concepts of Guilty and Not Guilty, and target concepts of Black and
White.72 The other IAT, the Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT, was a race IAT with the
evaluative concepts of Pleasant and Unpleasant, and target concepts of Black and
White.73 The Modem Racism Scale consists of a series of questions that measure
over 18 years of age and none had been convicted of a felony. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 40,
with a mean age of 21.85 (SD=3.95). Twenty-five participants identified themselves as Japanese
American, eighteen participants identified themselves as European American, and five participants
identified themselves as Chinese American. Other participants identified themselves as Native
Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, Korean American, and Latino. Three participants identified themselves
as "mixed race," and five indicated "other." The likely ethnic diversity ofa Hawai'i-based sample, as
we found here, is notable. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1, at 396 (noting the
uniqueness and diversity of that Hawai'i based sample, and considering the meaning of the study
results in light of the diverse sample).
69 The instructions for the IATs were as follows: "For the next set of tasks you will be shown
words one at a time in the middle of the computer screen and asked to sort them into categories.
Your task is to sort each item into its correct category as fast as you can by pressing EITHER the 'D'
key or the 'K' key. IMPORTANT: Press the 'D' key using your left index finger, or 'K' key using your
right index finger. The categories associated with the 'D' and 'K' keys will be shown at the top of
each screen. Please pay close attention to these category labels-they change for each sorting task!"
70 For more on this task, see Levinson & Young, Different Shades of Bias, supra note 15.
7 Also, within each IAT, the tasks were counterbalanced,
72 One of the particularly interesting elements of the IAT is the way in which target words are
selected for inclusion into the dichotomous categories used in the IAT. In designing the Guilty/Not
Guilty IAT, we needed to choose stimuli for Black, White, Guilty, and Not Guilty. Our first goal was
to use stimuli that were validated, so as not to reinvent the wheel. For the categories of Black and
White, we thus used stimuli used in other IATs. These stimuli consisted of six photographs of faces
of White men and women and six photographs of faces of Black men and women. To select target
words for the categories Guilty and Not Guilty, we conducted a pre-test to ensure that the terms we
selected were most representative of the target concepts. This pre-test asked participants to rank how
much various words were associated with the criminal law concepts of Guilty and Not Guilty.
Considering mean score and standard deviation, we selected the target words that participants agreed
upon most. For Guilty, the target words were: at fault, caught in the act, committed crime, convict,
criminal, did it, perpetrator, responsible for crime. For Not Guilty, the target words were: acquitted,
blameless, cleared of charges, didn't do it, did not commit crime, wrongfully accused, guilt free, and
innocent.
7 This is one of the more common IATs that measures implicit attitudes. See Greenwald et
al., Measuring Individual Diferences, supra note 4, at 1465. For Pleasant, the target words were
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self reports regarding racial beliefs. It is one of the favored social cognition
measures for evaluating explicit racial preferences.74 The Scale asks participants
to respond to several statements about Blacks in America. 7 The feeling
thermometer measures, like the Modem Racism Scale, were designed to evaluate
explicit racial preferences. The feeling thermometer measures asked: "How warm
do you feel towards European Americans," and "How warm do you feel towards
African Americans?" The evidence evaluation task presented participants with the
story of an armed robbery. After reading the story, participants then saw a series
of crime scene photos, and were primed with either a photo of a dark skinned
perpetrator or light skinned perpetrator. Participants were then presented with a
list of individual pieces of evidence, and asked to score each piece of evidence
based on whether it tended to indicate that the defendant was guilty or not guilty.77
Finally, participants were also asked to decide whether the defendant was guilty or
not guilty, both on a dichotomous scale and on a continuous scale. After
completing the study, participants were thanked for their participation and
debriefed.
B. Scoring the IAT
Because the IAT is such a complicated measure, social scientists have
considered several scoring algorithms regarding the IAT. In calculating the results
of our study, we relied on the updated scoring algorithms suggested by Greenwald
and his colleagues.79 These improved algorithms addressed several challenges that
were raised regarding the original IAT scoring algorithm.80
beautiful, lovable, valuable, attractive, and smart. For Unpleasant, the target words were ugly,
useless, stupid, hostile, and inferior.
74 See generally John B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modem Racism
Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91 (John F. Dovido & Samuel L. Gaertner eds.,
1986) (introducing the Modem Racism Scale).
7s For example, one statement that participants respond to is: "Discrimination against Blacks
is no longer a problem in the United States."
76 The photos were identical, with the skin-tone altered using computer software. This skin-
tone manipulation was a between-subjects independent variable. Half the participants saw a dark-
skinned perpetrator and half the participants saw a light skinned perpetrator. Participants were
randomly assigned to the two priming conditions. For more on this element of the study, including a
theoretical discussion of evidence evaluation and detailed results, see generally Levinson & Young,
Different Shades of Bias, supra note 15.
n Some examples of this evidence were: "the defendant was a youth Golden Gloves boxing
champ in 2006; the defendant purchased an untraceable handgun three weeks before the robbery; the
defendant is a member of an anti-violence organization; and the defendant had a used movie ticket
stub for a show that started 20 minutes before the crime occurred."
7 The continuous scale ranged from 0 (definitely not guilty) to 100 (definitely guilty).
7 See Greenwald et al., Improved Scoring Algorithm, supra note 20, at 213-15.
so Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji's suggested improved scoring measure for the IAT, called a
D score, has improved test-response detection (for instance, it throws out indiscriminate responses or
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C. Results
1. Guilty/Not Guilty IAT
The results of the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT confirmed our hypothesis that there
is an implicit racial bias in the presumption of innocence. Participants displayed a
significant association between Black and Guilty 81 compared to White and
Guilty, 82 producing a significant IAT effect. 83 These results suggest that
participants held an implicit association between Black and Guilty.
2. Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT
The results of this study reproduced the results found in many attitude-race
IATs, including Pleasant/Unpleasant IATs conducted by other researchers. 84
Participants displayed a significant association between Black-Unpleasant
compared to White-Unpleasant. Specifically, participants associated Black and
unpleasant words85 significantly faster than Black and pleasant words,86 resulting
in a significant IAT effect.
3. Relationship of Implicit Measures to Explicit Measures
We next computed correlation coefficients in order to assess the relationship
between the implicit measures (the two IATs) and the explicit measures (the
Modem Racism Scale and the feeling thermometers). Interestingly, some implicit
scores were correlated with explicit scores. IAT scores on the Pleasant/Unpleasant
IAT were correlated with scores on the Modem Racism Scale, 8 such that
responses that indicate a lack of attention) and incorporates an inclusive standard deviation for all
congruent trials (for instance, both the practice and test block of white-guilty and black-not
guilty). Id. at 213. Mean latencies are computed for each block, and complimentary blocks are
subtracted from each other (e.g., practice white-not guilty and black-guilty would be subtracted from
practice white-guilty and black-not guilty). Id. at 214. These two difference scores are divided by
their inclusive standard deviation score, and the average of these two scores is called D. Id. For a
detailed summary of Greenwald and his colleagues' scoring algorithm, see Rachlinski et al., Trial
Judges, supra note 5, at 1245-46.
81 Mean = 727.63ms. The IAT measures target results together, such that this result measures
an implicit association between the pairs of Black-Guilty and White-Not Guilty, compared to the
pairs of White-Guilty and Black-Not Guilty.
82 Mean= 800.16ms, t= 2.68, p <0.01.
83 (D) of 0. 18 (t=3.36, df= 65, p <0.01).
8 For a broad review of IAT results, see Nosek et al., supra note 6, at 105-11.
85 Mean = 613.92ms.
86 Mean = 690.93ms, t = 3. 2 9 , p < 0.01.
" (D) of0.21 (t= 4.11, df= 6 5, p <0.01).
88 r =0.33,p <0.01.
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participants who displayed greater implicit bias were also likely to report less
favorable explicit attitudes towards African Americans. Correlations between the
Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT scores and scores on the feeling thermometer towards
African Americans were marginally significant, 89 such that participants who
displayed greater implicit bias were more likely to report cooler attitudes towards
African Americans.
4. Warm Feelings Towards African Americans Correlated with Guilty
Implicit Bias
Interestingly, correlation coefficients on the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT showed
one significant correlation that differed from the correlations found on the
Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT. Scores on the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT correlated with
scores on the feeling thermometer regarding feelings towards African Americans,9
such that people who reported feeling warmly towards African Americans were
more likely to show an implicit guilty bias against Blacks.9 '
The opposite correlation patterns of the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT and the
Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT suggest that the two implicit measures are measuring
different phenomena and tap into different implicit constructs. Although the
Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT appeared to tap into a construct measured by the Modem
Racism Scale and (marginally) the feeling thermometer, the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT
correlated with the feeling thermometer in an opposite direction and did not
correlate with the Modern Racism Scale.
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations of explicit and implicit measures,
and correlations among them (n=66).
Correlations
Variables Means SD 1 2 3
1. Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT 0.21 * 0.42
2. Guilty/Not Guilty IAT 0.18* 0.42 -0.07
3. Modern Racism Scale 12.56 4 0.33* -0.01
4. Thermometer Black 6.18 1.48 -0.23+ 0.29* 0.22+
Note:*p <.05 +p <.10.
r = -0.23, p = 0.06.
90 r =0.29,p<0.05.
9' Guilty/Not Guilty IAT scores were not significantly correlated with scores on the Modem
Racism Scale, r = -0.01, n = 66, p = 0.80, indicating that using that particular measure does not relate
to implicit biases in Guilty/Not Guilty associations.
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5. Predictive Validity: Guilty/Not Guilty and Pleasant/Unpleasant IATs
Predicted Evidence Judgments
To examine whether the IATs predicted participants' judgments of evidence
and criminal guilt, we created a regression model investigating the impact of the
two IATs on the totals of evidence judgments. The regression model showed that
having stronger implicit associations between Black and Guilty, and having
higher Black/Unpleasant IAT scores,94 predicted judgments of ambiguous evidence
as more indicative of guilt.95 It should be noted that the Guilty/Not Guilty and
Pleasant/Unpleasant IATs were individually significant in this model, which
indicates that each IAT separately predicted evidence judgments. In addition,
because the two IATs were each significant, it also suggests that the Guilty/Not
Guilty IAT and Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT are measuring different constructs and
are not interchangeable as measures of implicit bias.
Table 2: Regression Analysis
B SE t p
Constant 88.58 4.11 21.54 .000
BW 5.54 2.49 2.22 .030
GI 6.61 2.96 2.23 .029
AI 9.11 3.01 3.03 .004
Note: BW= black vs. white (1=black, 0-white)
GI= guilty IAT
AI= attitude IAT
Regression equation: Evidence = 88.58 + 5.74 x BW + 6.61 x GI + 9.11 x Al
+e
92 The regression model also included the variable of perpetrator skin tone (dark v. light) from
the evidence evaluation task. This variable was also predictive of judgments of ambiguous evidence
as more indicative of guilt, 0 = 0.25, t = 2.22, p < 0.05. This particular result is discussed in more
detail by Levinson & Young, Diferent Shades ofBias, supra note 15, at 337.
9 P=0.25, t = 2.23, p <0.05.
94 = 0.34, t =3.03, p <0.01.
9s As expected, IAT score did not alone predict guilty verdicts or guilty scale judgments. In
addition, it should be noted that our regression analysis found that the IATs predicted total evidence
judgments, rather than total evidence judgments based upon the skin tone of the perpetrator. This
later type of predictive validity should be measured in future studies with larger samples. Due to the
small sample size in this study, we did not expect to find significant results on such a regression
analysis.
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In order to investigate the relationship between the two IATs further, we
checked to see if the two IATs were correlated. The results indicated that the two
IATs were not correlated with each other, further suggesting that the Guilty/Not
Guilty IAT measures a different construct than the Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT.
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS: IMPLICIT BIAS AND GUILTY
AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN
The results of the empirical study show that, when it comes to racial equality
and the presumption of innocence, there is reason for concern. First, we found that
participants held implicit associations between Black and Guilty. Second, we
found that these implicit associations were meaningful-they predicted judgments
of the probative value of evidence. Third, we found that the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT
was unrelated to and operated differently than a well established attitude-based
IAT. Finally, we found that implicit attitudes of race and guilt are quite different
from attitudes of race revealed by using explicit measures; in fact, one explicit
measure even showed opposite results: participants who reported feeling warmer
towards African Americans actually showed more bias on the Guilty/Not Guilty
IAT. These findings, taken together, raise questions about racial justice in the
law and present evidence to challenge the integrity of the presumption of
innocence. It goes without saying that this fundamental legal principle, which "lies
at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law[,]"9 should neither
bend nor break when defendants are Black men.
It is also worth highlighting the success of the attitude IAT in our study. Like
the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT, the Pleasant/Unpleasant IAT revealed a significant
implicit racial bias and predicted evidence judgments. Although we believe that
the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT holds the most promise in this particular legal domain,
the versatility of attitude IATs is impressive. Researchers should continue to
investigate a broad range of IATs in the legal setting.99
Due to the single empirical study and still emerging nature of the Guilty/Not
Guilty IAT, it is premature to discuss solutions, if there are any,'o to the implicit
96 r = -0.07, p = 0.51.
9 Thus, asking jurors whether they can be unbiased is unlikely to reveal jurors with strong
implicit biases.
98 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
9 This future research should include stereotype IATs, which we did not test here. For one
interesting study testing the predictive validity of attitude IATs and stereotype IATs, see Rudman &
Ashmore, supra note 45, at 368 (finding that the stereotype IAT, but not the attitude IAT, predicted
economic decisions based on group status).
100 We intentionally phrase this qualifier in a pessimistic way. Although there is some reason
to believe that implicit biases can be temporarily mitigated using certain techniques, none of these
techniques address the cultural factors that lead to a society that harbors such biases. For more on
debiasing, see Kang & Banaji, supra note 35, at 1107-08 (examining their proposal of "fair
measures," which relies heavily on encouraging counterstereotypic job holders); Levinson, Forgotten
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bias revealed by the study. As a measure, the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT would be best
served by follow-up testing and subsequent amelioration, if necessary. For
example, the measure should be tested in a variety of locations and on broader
populations. In addition, the predictive validity of the measure should be tested in
realistic trial settings and in larger samples.
VI. CONCLUSION
We consider this study just one part of a broader effort to investigate whether
implicit biases facilitate societal and legal inequality.101 It is our hope that future
empirical studies of implicit bias in the law will continue this effort, specifically by
investigating a broad range of legal domains where implicit bias may affect legal
decision-making. There are so many areas of the law that have yet to be
considered as possible hideouts for implicit bias. A broad range of legal areas,
including but not limited to immigration law, contract law, and property law may
unknowingly be functioning with the covert and dangerous help of implicit bias.
We hope that future studies, particularly those conducted by interdisciplinary
research teams, will pursue these areas, while also continuing to investigate the
Guilty/Not Guilty IAT.
Racial Equality, supra note 1, at 411-412 (suggesting more diverse juries, multiculturalism training
for juries, and a more counter-stereotypic community of lawyers, but noting that cultural change is
the only true solution for implicit racial bias in the legal setting). For more on taking cultural
responsibility for implicit bias, see generally Levinson, The Complicitous Mind, supra note 14.
101 This broader effort holds deep importance for those concerned with social justice. Our
study, as well as many others, continues to raise questions about what implicit bias says about
American culture and society. We do not believe that the covert and automatic nature of implicit
racial biases, in light of persisting societal disparities, absolves society of the responsibility for their
harm. See generally Charles Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact
and Origins of "The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection," 40 CONN. L. REv. 931 (2008); Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 1; Levinson, The Complicitous Mind, supra note 14.
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